Soft Contract Verification by Nguyen, Phuc C. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
62
39
v4
  [
cs
.PL
]  
16
 Ju
n 2
01
4
Soft Contract Verification
Phúc C. Nguy˜ên
University of Maryland
pcn@cs.umd.edu
Sam Tobin-Hochstadt
Indiana University
samth@cs.indiana.edu
David Van Horn
University of Maryland
dvanhorn@cs.umd.edu
Abstract
Behavioral software contracts are a widely used mechanism for
governing the flow of values between components. However, run-
time monitoring and enforcement of contracts imposes significant
overhead and delays discovery of faulty components to run-time.
To overcome these issues, we present soft contract verification,
which aims to statically prove either complete or partial contract
correctness of components, written in an untyped, higher-order lan-
guage with first-class contracts. Our approach uses higher-order
symbolic execution, leveraging contracts as a source of symbolic
values including unknown behavioral values, and employs an up-
datable heap of contract invariants to reason about flow-sensitive
facts. We prove the symbolic execution soundly approximates the
dynamic semantics and that verified programs can’t be blamed.
The approach is able to analyze first-class contracts, recursive
data structures, unknown functions, and control-flow-sensitive re-
finements of values, which are all idiomatic in dynamic languages.
It makes effective use of an off-the-shelf solver to decide problems
without heavy encodings. The approach is competitive with a wide
range of existing tools—including type systems, flow analyzers,
and model checkers—on their own benchmarks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Verification; D.3.1 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Formal Definitions and Theory
Keywords Higher-order contracts; symbolic execution
1. Static verification for dynamic languages
Contracts (Meyer 1991; Findler and Felleisen 2002) have become
a prominent mechanism for specifying and enforcing invariants in
dynamic languages (Disney 2013; Plosch 1997; Austin et al. 2011;
Strickland et al. 2012; Hickey et al. 2013). They offer the expres-
sivity and flexibility of programming in a dynamic language, while
still giving strong guarantees about the interaction of components.
However, there are two downsides: (1) contract monitoring is ex-
pensive, often prohibitively so, which causes programmers to write
more lax specifications, compromising correctness for efficiency;
and (2) contract violations are found only at run-time, which delays
discovery of faulty components with the usual negative engineering
consequences.
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Static verification of contracts would empower programmers to
state stronger properties, get immediate feedback on the correct-
ness of their software, and avoid worries about run-time enforce-
ment cost since, once verified, contracts could be removed. All-
or-nothing approaches to verification of typed functional programs
has seen significant advances in the recent work on static contract
checking (Xu et al. 2009; Xu 2012; Vytiniotis et al. 2013), refine-
ment type checking (Terauchi 2010; Zhu and Jagannathan 2013;
Vazou et al. 2013, 2014), and model checking (Kobayashi 2009b;
Kobayashi et al. 2010, 2011). However, the highly dynamic nature
of untyped languages makes verification more difficult.
Programs in dynamic languages are often written in idioms that
thwart even simple verification methods such as type inference.
Moreover, contracts themselves are written within the host lan-
guage in the same idiomatic style. This suggests that moving be-
yond all-or-nothing approaches to verification is necessary.
In previous work (Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012), we
proposed an approach to soft contract verification, which enables
piecemeal and modular verification of contracts. This approach
augments a standard reduction semantics for a functional language
with contracts and modules by endowing it with a notion of “un-
known” values refined by sets of contracts. Verification is carried
out by executing programs on abstract values.
To demonstrate the essence of the idea, consider the following
contrived, but illustrative example. Let pos? and neg? be predicates
for positive and negative integers. Contracts can be arbitrary predi-
cates, so these functions are also contracts. Consider the following
contracted function (written in Lisp-like notation):
(f : pos? → neg?) ; contract
(define (f x) (* x -1)) ; function
We can verify this program by (symbolically) running it on an “un-
known” input. Checking the domain contract refines the input to be
an unknown satisfying the set of contracts {pos?}. By embedding
some basic facts about pos?, neg?, and -1 into the reduction relation
for *, we conclude (* {pos?} -1) 7−→ {neg?}, and voilà, we’ve
shown once and for all f meets its contract obligations and can-
not be blamed. We could therefore soundly eliminate any contract
which blames f, in this case neg?.
This approach is simple and effective for many programs, but
suffers from several shortcomings, which we solve in this paper:
Solver-aided reasoning: While embedding symbolic arithmetic
knowledge for specific, known contracts works for simple exam-
ples, it fails to reason about arithmetic generally. Contracts of-
ten fail to verify because equivalent formulations of contracts are
not hard-coded in the semantics of primitives. Many systems ad-
dress this issue by incorporating an SMT solver. However, for a
higher-order language, solver integration is often achieved by rea-
soning in a theory of uninterpreted functions or semantic embed-
dings (Knowles and Flanagan 2010; Rondon et al. 2008; Vytiniotis
et al. 2013).
In this paper, we observe that higher-order contracts can be
effectively verified using only a simple first-order solver. The key
insight is that contracts delay higher-order checks and failures
always occur with a first order witness. By relying on a (symbolic)
semantic approach to carry out higher-order contract monitoring,
we can use an SMT solver to reason about integers without the
need for sophisticated encodings. (Examples in §2.3.)
Flow sensitive reasoning: Just as our semantic approach de-
composes higher-order contracts into first-order properties, first-
order contracts naturally decompose into conditionals. Our prior
approach fails to reason effectively about conditionals, requiring
contract checks to be built-in to the semantics. As a result, even
simple programs with conditionals fail to verify:
(g : int? → neg?)
(define (g x) (if (pos? x) (f x) (f 8)))
This is because the true-branch call to f is (f {int?}) by substitu-
tion, although we know from the guard that x satisfies pos?.
In this paper, we observe that flow-sensitivity can be achieved
by replacing substitution with heap-allocated abstract values.
These heap addresses are then refined as they flow through pred-
icates and primitive operations, with no need for special handling
of contracts (§2.2). As a result, the system is not only effective
for contract verification, but can also handle safety verification for
programs with no contracts at all.
First-class contracts: Pragmatic contract systems enable first-
class contracts so new combinators can be written as functions that
consume and produce contracts. But to the best of our knowledge,
no verification system currently supports first class contracts (or
refinements), and in most approaches it appears fundamentally
difficult to incorporate such a notion.
Because we handle contracts (and all other features) by execu-
tion, first-class contracts pose no significant technical challenge and
our system reasons about them effectively (§2.5).
Converging for non-tail recursion: Of course, simply executing
programs has a fundamental drawback—it will fail to terminate
in many cases, and when the inputs are unknown, execution will
almost always diverge. Our prior work used a simple loop detection
algorithm that handled only tail-recursive functions. As a result,
even simple programs operating over inductive data timed out.
In this paper, we accelerate the convergence of programs by
identifying and approximating regular accumulation of evaluation
contexts, causing common recursive programs to converge on un-
known values, while providing precise predictions (§2.4). As with
the rest of our approach, this happens during execution and is there-
fore robust to complex, higher-order control flow.
Combining these techniques yields a system competitive with a
diverse range of existing powerful static checkers, achieving many
of their strengths in concert, while balancing the benefits of static
contract verification with the flexibility of dynamic enforcement.
We have built a prototype soft verification engine, which we dub
SCV, based on these ideas and used it to evaluate the approach (§4).
Our evaluation demonstrates that the approach can verify proper-
ties typically reserved for approaches that rely on an underlying
type system, while simultaneously accommodating the dynamism
and idioms of untyped programming languages. We take exam-
ples from work on soft typing (Cartwright and Fagan 1991; Wright
and Cartwright 1997), type systems for untyped languages (Tobin-
Hochstadt and Felleisen 2010), static contract checking (Xu et al.
2009; Xu 2012), refinement type checking (Terauchi 2010), and
model checking of higher-order functional languages (Kobayashi
2009b; Kobayashi et al. 2010, 2011).
SCV can prove all contract checks redundant for almost all of
the examples taken from this broad array of existing program anal-
ysis and type checking work, and can handle many of the tricky
higher-order verification problems demonstrated by other systems.
In other words, our approach is competitive with type systems,
model checkers, and soft typing systems on each of their chosen
benchmarks—in contrast, work on higher-order model checking
does not handle benchmarks aimed at soft typing or occurrence
typing, and vice versa. In the cases where SCV does not prove the
complete absence of contract errors, the vast majority of possible
dynamic errors are ruled out, justifying numerous potential opti-
mizations. Over this corpus of programs, 99% of the contract and
run-time type checks are proved safe, and could be eliminated.
We also evaluate the verification of three small interactive video
games which use first-class and dependent contracts pervasively.
The results show the subsequent elimination of contract monitoring
has a dramatic effect: from a factor speed up of 7 in one case, to
three orders of magnitude in the others. In essence, these results
show the games are infeasible without contract verification.
2. Worked examples
We now present the main ideas of our approach through a series of
examples taken from work on other verification techniques, starting
from the simplest and working up to a complex object encoding.
2.1 Higher-order symbolic reasoning
Consider the following simple function that transforms functions
on even integers into functions on odd integers. It has been ascribed
this specification as a contract, which can be monitored at run-time.
(e2o : (even? → even?) → (odd? → odd?))
(define (e2o f)
(λ (n) (- (f (+ n 1)) 1)))
A contract monitors the flow of values between components. In
this case, the contract monitors the interaction between the context
and the e2o function. It is easy to confirm that e2o is correct with
respect to the contract; e2o holds up its end of the agreement, and
therefore cannot be blamed for any run-time failures that may arise.
The informal reasoning goes like this: First assume f is an even?
→ even? function. When applied, we must ensure the argument is
even (otherwise e2o is at fault), but may assume the result is even
(otherwise the context is at fault). Next assume n is odd (otherwise
the context is at fault) and ensure the result is odd (otherwise e2o
is at fault). Since (+ n 1) is even when n is odd, f is applied to an
even argument, producing an even result. Subtracting one therefore
gives an odd result, as desired.
This kind of reasoning mimics the step-by-step computation of
e2o, but rather than considering some particular inputs, it considers
these inputs symbolically to verify all possible executions of e2o.
We systematize this kind of reasoning by augmenting a standard
reduction semantics for contracts with symbolic values that are
refined by sets of contracts. At first approximation, the semantics
includes reductions such as:
(+ {odd?} 1) 7−→ {even?}, and
({even? → even?} {even?}) 7−→ {even?}.
This kind of symbolic reasoning mimics a programmer’s infor-
mal intuitions which employ contracts to refine unknown values
and to verify components meet their specifications. If a component
cannot be blamed in the symbolic semantics, we can safely con-
clude it cannot be blamed in general.
2.2 Flow sensitive reasoning
Programmers using untyped languages often use a mixture of type-
based and flow-based reasoning to design programs. The analysis
naturally takes advantage of type tests idiomatic in dynamic lan-
guages even when the tests are buried in complex expressions. The
following function taken from work on occurrence typing (Tobin-
Hochstadt and Felleisen 2010) can be proven safe using our sym-
bolic semantics:
(f : (or/c int? str?) cons? → int?)
(define (f x p)
(cond
[(and (int? x) (int? (car p))) (+ x (car p))]
[(int? (car p)) (+ (str-len x) (car p))]
[else 0]))
Here, int?, str?, and cons? are type predicates for integers,
strings, and pairs, respectively. The contract (or/c int? str?)
uses the or/c contract combinator to construct a contract specify-
ing a value is either an integer or a string.
A programmer would convince themselves this program was
safe by using the control dominating predicates to refine the types
of x and (car p) in each branch of the conditional.1 Our symbolic
semantics accommodates exactly this kind of reasoning in order to
verify this example. However, there is a technical challenge here. A
straightforward substitution-based semantics would not reflect the
flow-sensitive facts. Focusing just on the first clause, a substitution
model would give:
(cond
[(and (int? {(or/c int? str?)}) (int? (car {cons?})))
(+ {(or/c int? str?)} (car {cons?}))] ...)
At this point, it’s too late to communicate the refinement of these
sets implied by the test evaluating to true, so the semantics would
report the contract on + potentially being violated because the
first argument may be a string, and the second argument may
be anything. We overcome this challenge by modelling symbolic
values as heap-allocated sets of contracts. When predicates and
data structure accessors are applied to heap addresses, we refine
the corresponding sets to reflect what must be true. So the program
is modelled as:
(cond
[(and (int? L1) (int? (car L2)))
(+ L1 (car L2))] ...)
where L1 7→ {(or/c int? string?)}, L2 7→ {cons?}
In the course of evaluating the test, we get to (int? L1), the
semantics conceptually forks the evaluator and refines the heap:
(int? L1) 7−→ true, where L1 7→ {int?}
7−→ false, where L1 7→ {string?}
Similar refinements to L2 are communicated through the heap for
(int? (car L2)), thereby making (+ L1 (car L2)) safe. This
simple idea is effective in achieving flow-based refinements. It
naturally handles deeply nested and inter-procedural conditionals.
2.3 Incorporating an SMT solver
The techniques described so far are highly effective for reasoning
about functions and many kinds of recursive data structures. How-
ever, effective reasoning about many kinds of base values, such as
integers, requires sophisticated domain-specific knowledge. Rather
than build such a tool ourselves, we defer to existing high-quality
solvers for these domains. Unlike many solver-aided verification
tools, however, we use the solver only for queries on base values,
rather than attempting to encode a rich, higher-order language into
one that is accepted by the solver.
To demonstrate our approach, we take an example (intro3)
from work on model checking higher-order programs (Kobayashi
et al. 2010).
(>/c : int? → any → bool?)
(define (>/c lo) (λ (x) (and (int? x) (> x lo))))
1 The call to str-len is safe because (and (int? x) (int? (car p))) be-
ing false and (int? (car p)) being true implies that (int? x) is false,
which in turns implies x is a string as enforced by f’s contract.
(define (f x g) (g (+ x 1)))
(h : [x : int?] → [y : (>/c x)] → (>/c y))
(define (h x) ...) ; unknown definition
(main : int? → (>/c 0))
(define (main n) (if (≥ n 0) (f n (h n)) 1))
In this program, we define a contract combinator (>/c) that cre-
ates a check for an integer from a lower bound; a helper function
f, which comes without a contract; and an unknown function h that
given an integer x, returns a function mapping some number y that
is greater than x to an answer greater than y—here h’s specifica-
tion is given, but not its implementation. (Note h’s contract is de-
pendent.) We verify main’s correctness, which means it definitely
returns a positive integer and does not violate h’s contract.
According to its contract, main is passed an integer n. If n
is negative, main returns 1, satisfying the contract. Otherwise the
function applies f to n and (h n). Function h, by its contract, returns
another function that requires a number greater than n. Examining
f’s definition, we see h (now bound to g) is eventually applied to
(+ n 1). Let n1 be the result of (+ n 1). And by h’s contract, we
know the answer is another integer greater than (+ n 1). Let us
name this answer n2. In order to verify that main satisfies contract
(>/c 0), we need to verify that n2 is a positive integer.
Once f returns, the heap contains several addresses with con-
tracts:
n 7→ {int?, (≥/c 0)}
n1 7→ {int?, (=/c (+ n 1))}
n2 7→ {int?, (>/c n1)}
We then translate this information to a query for an external solver:
n, n1, n2: INT;
ASSERT n ≥ 0;
ASSERT n1 = n + 1;
ASSERT n2 > n1;
QUERY n2 > 0;
Solvers such as CVC4 (Barrett et al. 2011) and Z3 (De Moura
and Bjørner 2008) easily verify this implication, proving main’s
correctness.
Refinements such as (≥/c 0) are generated by primitive appli-
cations (≥ x 0), and queries are generated from translation of the
heap, not arbitrary expressions. This has a few consequences. First,
by the time we have value v satisfying predicate p on the heap,
we know that p terminates successfully on v. Issues such as errors
(from p itself) or divergence are handled elsewhere in other eval-
uation branches. Second, we only need to translate a small set of
simple, well understood contracts—not arbitrary expressions. Eval-
uation naturally breaks down complex expressions, and properties
are discovered even when they are buried in complex, higher-order
functions. Given a translation for (>/c 0), the analysis automati-
cally takes advantage of the solver even when the predicate con-
tains > in a complex way, such as (λ (x) (or (> x 0) e) where e
is an arbitrary expression. Predicates that lack translations to SMT
only reduce precision, never soundness.
2.4 Converging for non-tail recursion
The techniques sketched above provide high precision in the exam-
ples considered, but simply executing programs on abstract values
is unlikely to terminate in the presence of recursion. When an ab-
stract value stands for an infinite set of concrete values, execution
may proceed infinitely, building up an ever-growing evaluation con-
text. To tackle this problem, we summarize this context to coalesce
repeated structures and enable termination on many recursive pro-
grams. Although guaranteed termination is not our goal, the empir-
ical results (§4) demonstrate that the method is effective in practice.
The following example program is taken from work on model
checking of higher-order functional programs (Kobayashi et al.
2010), and demonstrates checking non-trivial safety properties on
recursive functions. Note that no loop invariants need be provided
by the user.
(main : (and/c int? ≥0?) → (and/c int? ≥0?))
(define (main n)
(let ([l (make-list n)])
(if (> n 0) (car (reverse l empty)) 0)))
(define (reverse l ac)
(if (empty? l) ac
(reverse (cdr l) (cons (car l) ac))))
(define (make-list n)
(if (= n 0) empty
(cons n (make-list (- n 1))))))
Again, we aim to verify both the specified contract for main as
well as the preconditions for primitive operations such as car. Most
significantly, we need to verify that (reverse l empty) produces a
non-empty list (so that car succeeds) and that its first element is a
positive integer. The local functions reverse and make-list do not
come with a contract.
This problem is more challenging than the original OCaml
version of the same program, due to the lack of types. This program
represents a common idiom in dynamic languages: not all values
are contracted, and there is no type system on which to piggy-
back verification. In addition, programmers often rely on inter-
procedural reasoning to justify their code’s correctness, as here
with reverse.
We verify main by applying it to an abstract (unknown) value
n1. The contract ensures that within the body, n1 is a non-negative
integer.
The integer n1 is first passed to make-list. The comparison (=
n1 0) non-deterministically returns true and false, updating the
information known about n1 to be either 0 or (>/c 0) in each corre-
sponding case. In the first case, make-list returns empty. In the sec-
ond case, make-list proceeds to the recursive application (make-
list n2), where n2 is the abstract non-negative integer obtained
from evaluating (- n1 1). However, (make-list n2) is identical to
the original call (make-list n1) up to renaming, since both n1 and
n2 are non-negative. Therefore, we pause here and use a summary
of make-list’s result instead of continuing in an infinite loop.
Since we already know that empty is one possible result of
(make-list n1), we use it as the result of (make-list n2). The
application (make-list n1) therefore produces the pair 〈n1,empty〉,
which is another answer for the original application. We could
continue this process and plug this new result into the pending
application (make-list n2). But by observing that the application
produces a list of one positive integer when the recursive call
produces empty, we approximate the new result 〈n1,empty〉 to a
non-empty list of positive integers, and then use this approximate
answer as the result of the pending application (make-list n2).
This then induces another result for (make-list n1), a list of two or
more positive integers, but this is subsumed by the previous answer
of non-empty integer list. We have now discovered all possible
return values of make-listwhen applied to a non-negative integer:
it maps 0 to empty, and positive integers to a non-empty list of
positive integers.
Although our explanation made use of the order, the soundness
of analyzing make-list does not depend on the order of explor-
ing non-deterministic branches. Each recursive application with re-
peated arguments generates a waiting context, and each function
return generates a new case to resume. There is an implicit work-
list algorithm in the modified semantics (§3.8).
When make-list returns to main, we have two separate cases:
either n1 is 0 and l is empty, or n1 is positive and l is non-empty.
In the first case, (> n1 0) is false and main returns 0, satisfying
the contract. Otherwise, main proceeds to reversing the list before
taking its first element.
Using the same mechanism as with make-list, the analysis in-
fers that reverse returns a non-empty list when either of its argu-
ments (l or acc) is non-empty. In addition, reverse only receives
arguments of proper lists, so all partial operations on l such as car
and cdr are safe when l is not empty, without needing an explicit
check. The function eventually returns a non-empty list of integers
to main, justifying main’s call to the partial function car, produc-
ing a positive integer. Thus, main never has a run-time error in any
context.
While this analysis makes use of the implementation of make-
list and reverse, that does not imply that it is whole-program.
Instead, it is modular in its use of unknown values abstracting ar-
bitrary behavior. For example, make-list could instead be an ab-
stract value represented by a contract that always produces lists of
integers. The analysis would still succeed in proving all contracts
safe except the use of car in main—this shows the flexibility avail-
able in choosing between precision and modularity. In addition, the
analysis does not have to be perfectly precise to be useful. If it suc-
cessfully verifies most contracts in a module, that already greatly
improves confidence about the module’s correctness and justifies
the elimination of numerous expensive dynamic checks.
2.5 Putting it all together
The following example illustrates all aspects of our system. For
this, we choose a simple encoding of classes as functions that
produce objects, where objects are again functions that respond
to messages named by symbols. We then verify the correctness
of a mixin: a function from classes to classes. The vec/c contract
enforces the interface of a 2D-vector class whose objects accept
messages ’x, ’y, and ’add for extracting components and vector
addition.
(define vec/c
([msg : (one-of/c ’x ’y ’add)]
→ (match msg
[(or ’x ’y) real?]
[’add (vec/c → vec/c)])))
This definition demonstrates several powerful contract system fea-
tures which we are able to handle:
• contracts are first-class values, as in the definition of vec/c,
• contracts may include arbitrary predicates, such as real?,
• contracts may be recursive, as in the contract for ’add,
• function contracts may express dependent relationships be-
tween the domain and range—the contract of the result of
method selection for vec/c depends on the method chosen.
Suppose we want to define a mixin that takes any class that
satisfies the vec/c interface and produces another class with added
vector operations such as ’len for computing the vector’s length.
The extend function defines this mixin, and ext-vec/c specifies
the new interface. We verify that extend violates no contracts and
returns a class that respects specifications from ext-vec/c.
(extend : (real? real? → vec/c)
→ (real? real? → ext-vec/c))
(define (extend mk-vec)
(λ (x y)
(let ([vec (mk-vec x y)])
(λ (m)
(match m
[’len
(let ([x (vec ’x)] [y (vec ’y)])
(sqrt (+ (* x x) (* y y))))]
[_ (vec m)])))))
(define ext-vec/c
([msg : (one-of/c ’x ’y ’add ’len)]
→ (match msg
[(or ’x ’y) real?]
[’add (vec/c → vec/c)]
[’len (and/c real? (≥/c 0))])))
To verify extend, we provide an arbitrary value, which is guar-
anteed by its contract to be a class matching vec/c. The mixin re-
turns a new class whose objects understand messages ’x, ’y, ’add,
and ’len. This new class defines method ’len and relies on the un-
derlying class to respond to ’x, ’y, and ’add. Because the old class
is constrained by contract vec/c, the new class will not violate its
contract when responding to messages ’x, ’y, and ’add.
For the ’lenmessage, the object in the new vector class extracts
its components as abstract numbers x and y, according to interface
vec/c. It then computes their squares and leaves the following
information on the heap:
x
2 7→ {real?, (=/c (* x x))}
y2 7→ {real?, (=/c (* y y))}
s 7→ {real?, (=/c (+ x2 y2))}
Solvers such as Z3 (De Moura and Bjørner 2008) can handle simple
non-linear arithmetic and verify that the sum s is non-negative,
thus the sqrt operation is safe. Execution proceeds to take the
square root—now called l—and refines the heap with the following
mapping:
l 7→ {real?, (=/c (sqrt s))}
When the method returns, its result is checked by contract ext-
vec/c to be a non-negative number. We again rely on the solver to
prove that this is the case.
Therefore, extend is guaranteed to produce a new class that is
correct with respect to interface vec-ext/c, justifying the elimina-
tion of expensive run-time checks. In a Racket program computing
the length of 100000 random vectors, eliminating these contracts
results in a 100-fold speed-up. While such dramatic results are un-
likely in full programs, measurements of existing Racket programs
suggests that 50% speedups are possible (Strickland et al. 2012).
3. A Symbolic Language with Contracts
In this section, we give a reduction system describing the core of
our approach. Symbolic λC is a model of a language with first-
class contracts and symbolic values. We first present the semantics,
including handling of primitives and unknown functions. We then
describe how the handling of primitive values integrates with exter-
nal solvers. Finally, we show an abstraction of our symbolic system
to accelerate convergence. For each abstraction, we relate concrete
and symbolic programs and prove a soundness theorem.
At a high level, the key idea of our semantics is that abstract val-
ues behave non-deterministically in all possible ways that concrete
values might behave. Furthmore, abstract values can be bounded
by specifications in the form of contracts that limit these behaviors.
As a result, an operational semantics for abstract values explores
all the ways that the concrete program under consideration might
be used.
Given this operational semantics, we can then examine the re-
sults of evaluation to see if any results are errors blaming the com-
ponents we wish to verify. If they do not, then our soundness theo-
rem implies that there are no ways for the component to be blamed,
regardless of what other parts of the program do. Thus, we have
Programs p, q ::= −→m e
Modules m ::= (module f uc u)
Expressions e, c, d ::= v | xℓ | e eℓ | o−→e ℓ | if e e e | c→λx.d
| monℓ,ℓℓ (c, e) | blame
ℓ
ℓ | assume(v, v)
Pre-values u ::= λx.e | b | 〈v,v〉 | v→λx.c | •
Values v ::= a | u/−→v
Base values b ::= true | false | n | empty
Operations o ::= o? | cons | car | cdr | add1 | + | =
| . . .
Predicates o? ::= num? | false? | cons? | empty?
| proc? | dep?
Variables x, f, ℓ ∈ identifier
Addresses a ∈ address
Figure 1. Syntax of Symbolic λC
verified the component against its contract in all contexts. We make
this notion precise in section 3.6.
3.1 Syntax of Symbolic λC
Our initial language models the functional core of many modern
dynamic languages, extended with behavioral, first-class contracts,
as well as symbolic values. The abstract syntax is shown in figure 1.
Syntax needed only for symbolic execution is highlighted in gray ;
we discuss it after the syntax of concrete programs.
A program p is a sequence of module definitions followed by
a top-level expression which may reference the modules. Each
module m has a name f and exports a single value u with behavior
enforced by contract uc. (Generalizing to multiple-export modules
is straightforward.)
Expressions include standard forms such as values, variable
and module references, applications, and conditionals, as well as
those for constructing and monitoring contracts. Contracts are first-
class values and can be produced by arbitrary expressions. For
clarity, when an expression plays the role of a contract, we use the
metavariable c and d, rather than e. A dependent function contract
(c→λx.d) monitors a function’s argument with c and its result
with the contract produced by applying λx.d to the argument.
A contract violation at run-time causes blame, an error with
information about who violated the contract. We write blameℓℓ′′ to
mean module ℓ is blamed for violating the contract from ℓ′′. The
form (monℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(c, e)) monitors expression e with contract c, with ℓ
being the positive party, ℓ′ the negative party, and ℓ′′ the source of
the contract. The system blames the positive party if e produces a
value violating c, and the negative one if e is misused by the context
of the contract check. To make context information available at run-
time, we annotate references and applications with labels indicating
the module they appear in, or † for the top-level expression. For
example, x† denotes a reference to the name x from the top level,
and (add1 x)ℓ denotes an addition inside module ℓ. When a module
ℓ causes a primitive error, such as applying 5, we also write blameℓΛ,
indicating that it violates a contract with the language. We omit
labels when they are irrelevant or can be inferred.
Pre-values u—extended to values below—include abstractions,
base values, pairs of values, and dependent contracts with domain
components evaluated. Base values include numbers, booleans,
and the empty list. Primitive operations over values are standard,
including predicates o? for dynamic testing of data types.
To reason about absent components, we equip λC with un-
known, or symbolic values, which abstract over multiple concrete
values exhibiting a range of behavior. An unknown value • stands
for any value in the language. For soundness, execution must ac-
count for all possible concretizations of abstract values, and reduc-
tion becomes non-deterministic. As the program proceeds through
tests and contract checks, more assumptions can be made about
abstract values. To remember these assumptions, we take the pre-
values and refine each with a set of contracts it is known to satisfy,
written u/−→v .
Finally, to track refinements of unknown values, we use heap
addresses a as symbolic values and track them in a heap, which is
a finite map from addresses to refined pre-values:
Heaps σ ::=
−−−−−→
〈a,u/−→v 〉.
The heap σ maps addresses allocated for unknown values to refine-
ments expressed as contracts; these refinements are updated during
reduction and represent upper bounds on what they might be at run-
time. Intuitively, any possible concrete execution can be obtained
by substituting addresses with concrete values within bounds spec-
ified by the heap. We omit refinements when they are empty or
irrelevant.
3.2 Semantics of Symbolic λC
We now turn to the reduction semantics for Symbolic λC, which
combines standard rules for untyped languages with behavior for
unknown values. Reduction is defined as a relation on states, pa-
rameterized by a module context:
−→m ⊢ ς 7−→ ς ′
States consist either of an expression paired with a heap, or blame:
States ς ::= (e, σ) | blameℓℓ.
We present the rules inline; a full version of all rules is given
in the appendix of the the accompanying technical report (Nguy˜ên
et al. 2014). In the inline presentation of rules, we systematically
omit labels in contracts, these are presented in the full rules. We
omit the module context whenever it is irrelevant.
3.2.1 Basic rules
Applications of primitives are interpreted by a δ relation, which
maps operations, arguments and heaps to results and new heaps.
Apply-Primitive
δ(σ, o−→v , ) ∋ ς
(o−→v ), σ 7−→ ς
The use of a δ relation in reduction semantics is standard, but
typically it is a function and is independent of the heap. We make
δ dependent on the heap in order to use and update the current
set of invariants; we make it a relation, since it may behave non-
deterministically on unknown values. For example, in interpreting
(> • 5), the δ relation will produce two results: one true, with an
updated heap to reflect the unknown value is (>/c 5); the other
false, with a heap reflecting the opposite. The δ relation is thus the
hub of the verification system and a point of interaction with the
SMT solver. It is described in more detail in section 3.3.
Applications of λ-abstractions follow standard β-reduction; ap-
plications of non-functions result in blame.
Apply-Function
((λx.e) v), σ 7−→ [v/x]e, σ
Apply-Non-Function
δ(σ, proc?, v) ∋ (false, σ′)
(v v′), σ 7−→ blame, σ′
Notice that the δ relation is employed to determine whether the
value in operator position is a function using the proc? primitive.
(Non-functions include concrete numbers and booleans as well as
abstract values known to exclude functions; application of abstract
values that may be functions is described in section 3.2.3.)
Conditionals follow a common treatment in untyped languages
in which values other than false are considered true.
If-True
δ(σ, false?, v) ∋ (false, σ′)
if v e1 e2, σ 7−→ e1, σ
′
If-False
δ(σ, false?, v) ∋ (true, σ′)
if v e1 e2, σ 7−→ e2, σ
′
Just as in the case of Apply-Non-Function, the interpretation of
conditionals uses the δ relation to determine whether false? holds,
which takes into account all of the knowledge accumulated in σ
and in either branch that is taken, updates the current knowledge to
reflect whether false? of v holds. This is the mechanism by which
control-flow based refinements are enabled.
The two rules for module references reflect the approach
in which contracts are treated as boundaries between compo-
nents (Dimoulas et al. 2011): a module self-reference incurs no
contract check, while cross-module references are protected by the
specified contract.
Module-Self-Reference
(module f uc u) ∈
−→m
−→m ⊢ ff, σ 7−→ u, σ
Module-External-Reference
(module f uc u) ∈
−→m f 6= ℓ
−→m ⊢ f ℓ, σ 7−→ mon(uc, u), σ
Finally, any state that is stuck with blame inside an evaluation
context transitions to a final blame state that discards the surround-
ing context and heap.
Halt-Blame
E [blame], σ 7−→ blame
Evaluation contexts as defined as follows:
E ::= [ ] | E e | v E | o−→v E−→e | if E e e
| mon(E , e) | mon(v, E) | E →λx.e
3.2.2 Contract monitoring
Contract monitoring follows existing operational semantics for
contracts (Findler and Felleisen 2002), with extensions to handle
and refine symbolic values.
There are several cases for checking a value against a contract.
If the contract is not a function contract, we say it is flat, denoting
a first-order property to be checked immediately. We thus expand
the checking expression to a conditional.
Monitor-Flat-Contract
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (false, σ
′) σ′ ⊢ v : vc ?
mon(vc, v), σ 7−→ if (vc v) assume(v, vc) blame, σ
′
Since contracts are first-class, they can also be abstract values; we
rely on δ to determine whether a value is a flat contract by using (the
negation of) the predicate for dependent contracts, dep?, instead of
examining the syntax. This rule is standard except for the use of
assume(v, vc) and the (· ⊢ · : · ?) judgment. The assume(v, vc)
form, which would normally just be v, dynamically refines value
v and the heap to indicate that v satisfies vc; assume is discussed
further in section 3.2.3. The judgment σ′ ⊢ v : vc ?, which would
normally just be omitted, indicates that the contract vc cannot be
statically judged to either pass or fail for v, which is why the
predicate must be applied. This judgment and its closely related
counterparts (· ⊢ · : ·!) and (· ⊢ · : ·%), which statically prove
a value must or must not satisfy a given contract respectively, are
discussed in section 3.4. If a flat contract can be statically proved
or refuted, monitoring can be short-circuited.
Monitor-Proved
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (false, σ
′)
σ′ ⊢ v : vc!
mon(vc, v), σ 7−→ v, σ
′
Monitor-Refuted
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (false, σ
′)
σ′ ⊢ v : vc%
mon(vc, v), σ 7−→ blame, σ
′
Monitoring a function contract against a function is interpreted
the standard η-expansion of contracts.
Monitor-Function-Contract
δ(σ, proc?, v) ∋ (true, σ′)
mon(vc→λx.d, v), σ 7−→ λx.mon(d, (v mon(vc, x))), σ
′
Monitoring a function contract against a non-function results in
an error.
Monitor-Non-Function
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (true, σ1) δ(σ1, proc?, v) ∋ (false, σ2)
mon(vc, v), σ 7−→ blame, σ2
When a dependent contract is represented by a address in the
heap, we look up the address and use the result.
Monitor-Unknown-Function-Contract
δ(σ, dep?, a) ∋ (true, σ1)
δ(σ1, proc?, v) ∋ (true, σ2) σ2(a) = vc→λx.d
mon(a, v), σ 7−→ λx.mon(d, v mon(vc, x)), σ2
3.2.3 Handling unknown values
The final set of reduction rules concern unknown values and refine-
ments.
Refine-Concrete
u 6= •
u, σ 7−→ u/∅, σ
Refine-Unknown
a /∈ dom(σ)
•, σ 7−→ a, σ[a 7→ •/∅]
These two rules show reduction of pre-values, which initially have
no refinement. If the pre-value is unknown, we additionally create
a fresh address and add it to the heap.
The assume form uses the refine metafunction to update the
heap of refinements to take into account the new information; see
figure 2 for the definition of refine.
Assume
(σ′, v′) = refine(σ, v, vc)
assume(v, vc), σ 7−→ v
′, σ′
Refinement is straightforward propagation of known contracts, in-
cluding expanding values known to be pairs via cons? into pair
values, and values known to be function contracts (via dep?) into
function contract values.
Finally, we must handle application of unknown values. The
first rule simply produces a new unknown value and heap address
for the result of a call. If the unknown function came with a
contract, this new unknown value will be refined by the contract
via reduction.
Apply-Unknown
δ(σ, proc?, a) ∋ (true, σ′)
a v, σ 7−→ aa, σ
′[aa 7→ •]
Havoc
δ(σ, proc?, a) ∋ (true, σ′)
a v, σ 7−→ havoc v, σ′
The second reduction rule for applying an unknown function,
labeled Havoc, handles the possible dynamic behavior of the un-
known function. A value passed to the unknown function may it-
self be a function with behavior, whose implementation we hope
to verify. This function may further be invoked by the unknown
function on unknown arguments. To simulate this, we assume arbi-
trary behavior from this unknown function and put the argument in
a so-called demonic context implemented by the havoc operation,
defined in a module added to every program; the definition is given
below.
(module havoc (any→λ_.false)
(λx.amb({(havoc (x •)), (havoc (car x)), (havoc (cdr x))})))
amb({e}) = e
amb({e, e1, . . . }) = if • e amb({e1, . . . })
refine(σ, a, v) = (σ′[a 7→ v′], a)
where (σ′, v′) = refine(σ, σ(a), v)
refine(σ, •/−→v , cons?) = (σ[a1 7→ •][a2 7→ •], 〈a1,a2〉/
−→v )
where a1, a2 /∈ dom(σ)
refine(σ, •/−→v , dep?) = (σ[a 7→ •], a→λx.•/−→v )
where a /∈ dom(σ)
refine(σ, u/−→v , vi) = (σ, u/
−→v ∪ {vi})
Figure 2. Refinement for Symbolic λC
δ(σ, o?, v) ∋ (true, σ) if σ ⊢ v : o?!
δ(σ, o?, v) ∋ (false, σ) if σ ⊢ v : o?%
δ(σ, o?, a) ⊇ {(true, σt), (false, σf )}
if σ ⊢ a : o? ? and (σt, _) = refine(σ, a, o?)
and (σf , _) = refine(σ, a,¬o?)
. . .
δ(σ, add1, n) ∋ (n+ 1, σ)
δ(σ, add1, v) ∋ (a, σ′[a 7→ •/num?])
where δ(σ, num?, v) ∋ (true, σ′), v 6= n, and a /∈ σ′
δ(σ, add1, v) ∋ (blameΛ, σ
′)
where δ(σ, num?, v) ∋ (false, σ′)
. . .
Figure 3. Selected primitive operations
The havoc function never produces useful results; its only purpose
is to probe for all potential errors in the value provided. This con-
text, and thus the havoc module, may be blamed for misuse of ac-
cessors and applications; we ignore these, as they represent poten-
tial failures in omitted portions of the program. Using havoc is key
to soundness in modular higher-order static checking (Fähndrich
and Logozzo 2011; Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012); we dis-
cuss its role further in section 3.6. Intuitively, precise execution of
properly contracted functions prevents havoc from destroying every
analysis.
3.3 Primitive operations
Primitive operations are the primary place where unknown values
in the heap are refined, in concert with successful contract checks.
Figure 3 shows a representative excerpt of δ’s definition; the full
definition is given in the accompanying technical report.
The first three rules cover primitive predicate checks. Ambi-
guity never occurs for concrete values, and an abstract value may
definitely prove or refute the predicate if the available information
is enough for the conclusion. If the proof system cannot decide
a definite result for the predicate check, δ conservatively includes
both answers in the possible results and records assumptions cho-
sen for each non-deterministic branch in the appropriate heap. The
last three rules reveal possible refinements when applying partial
functions such as add1, which fails when given non-numeric in-
puts. This mechanism, when combined with the SMT-aided proof
system given below, is sufficient to provide the precision necessary
to prove the absence of contract errors.
3.4 SMT-aided proof system
Contract checking and primitive operations rely on a proof system
to statically relate values and contracts. We write σ ⊢ v : vc! to
mean value v satisfies contract vc, where all addresses in v are
defined in σ. In other words, under any possible instantiation of the
unknown values in v, it would satisfy vc when checked according
to the semantics. On the other hand, σ ⊢ v : vc% indicates that
v definitely fails vc. Finally, σ ⊢ v : vc ? is a conservative answer
when information from the heap and refinement set is insufficient
to draw a definite conclusion. The effectiveness of our analysis
depends on the precision of this provability relation—increasing
the number of contracts that can be related statically to values
prunes spurious paths and eliminates impossible error cases.
3.4.1 Simple proof system
A simple proof system can be obtained which returns definite
answers for concrete values, uses heap refinements, and handles
negation of predicates and disjointness of data types.
σ ⊢ n : num?!
σ ⊢ n : o?% if o? ∈ {cons?,proc?,etc.}
σ ⊢ u/−→v : vi! if vi ∈ −→v
σ ⊢ u/−→v : o?% if ¬o? ∈ −→v
σ ⊢ a : v! if σ ⊢ σ(a) : v!
σ ⊢ a : v% if σ ⊢ σ(a) : v%
σ ⊢ a : v ? if σ ⊢ σ(a) : v ?
. . .
σ ⊢ v : vc ? (conservative default)
Notice that the proof system only needs to handle a small num-
ber of well-understood contracts. We rely on evaluation to natu-
rally break down complex contracts into smaller ones and take care
of subtle issues such as divergence and crashing. By the time we
have u/−→v , we can assume all contracts in −→v have terminated with
success on u. With these simple and obvious rules, our system can
already verify a significant number of interesting programs. With
SMT solver integration, as described below, we can handle far more
interesting constraints, including relations between numeric values,
without requiring an encoding of the full language.
3.4.2 Integrating an SMT solver
We extend the simple provability relation by employing an external
solver.
We first define the translation { ·} S from heaps and contract-
value pairs into formulas in solver S:
{
−−−→
(a, c)} S =
∧−−−−−→
{a : c} S
{a1 : (>/c n)} S = ASSERT a1 > n
{a1 : (>/c a2)} S = ASSERT a1 > a2
{a : (=/c (+ a1 a2))} S = ASSERT a = a1 + a2
. . .
The translation of a heap is the conjunction of all formulas gener-
ated from translatable refinements. The function is partial, and there
are straightforward rules for translating specific pairs of (a : c)
where c are drawn from a small set of simple, well-understood con-
tracts. This mechanism is enough for the system to verify many
interesting programs because the analysis relies on evaluation to
break down complex, higher-order predicates. Not having a trans-
lation for some contract c only reduces precision and does not affect
soundness.
Next, the extension (⊢S) is straightforward. The old relation
(⊢) is refined by a solver S. Whenever the basic relation proves
σ ⊢ v : c ?, we call out to the solver to try to either prove or refute
the claim:
{σ} S ∧ ¬{ v : c} S is unsat
σ ⊢S v : c!
{σ} S ∧ { v : c} S is unsat
σ ⊢S v : c%
The solver-aided relation uses refinements available on the heap to
generate premises {σ} S . Unsatisfiability of {σ} S ∧¬{ v : c} S is
equivalent to validity of {σ} S ⇒ { v : c} S , hence value definitely
satisfies contract c. Likewise, unsatisfiability of {σ} S ∧ { v : c} S
means v definitely refutes c. In any other case, we relate the value-
contract pair to the conservative answer.
3.5 Program evaluation
We give a reachable-states semantics to programs: the initial pro-
gram p is paired with an empty heap, and eval produces all states in
the reflexive, transitive closure of the single-step reduction relation
closed under evaluation contexts.
eval : p→ P(ς)
eval(−→me) = {ς | −→m ⊢ (e′; e), ∅ 7−→ ς}
where e′ = amb({true,
−−−−→
havocf}), (module f vc v) ∈
−→m
Modules with unknown definitions, which we call opaque, com-
plicate the definition of eval, since they may contain references
to concrete modules. If only the main module is considered, an
opaque module might misuse a concrete value in ways not visible
to the system. We therefore apply havoc to each concrete module
before evaluating the main expression.
3.6 Soundness
A program with unknown components is an abstraction of a fully-
known program. Thus, the semantics of the abstracted program
should approximate the semantics of any such concrete version. In
particular, any behavior the concrete program exhibits should also
be exhibited by the abstract approximation of that program.
However, we must be precise as to which behaviors are rele-
vant. Suppose we have a single concrete module that links against
a single opaque module. The semantics of this program should in-
clude all of the possible behaviors, both good and bad, of the known
module assuming the opaque module always lives up to its contract.
We exclude from consideration behaviors that cause the unknown
module to be blamed, since it is of course impossible to verify an
unknown program. In other words, we try to verify the parts of the
program that are known, assuming arbitrary, but correct, behavior
for the parts of the program that are unknown.
For this reason, the precise semantic account of blame is crucial.
The demonic havoc context can introduce blame of both the known
and unknown modules; since we can distinguish these parties, it is
easy to ignore blame of the unknown context.
In the remainder of this section, we formally define the approx-
imation relation and show that evaluation preserves the approxima-
tion, i.e. if program q is an approximation of program p (q is like p
but with potentially more unknowns), then the evaluation of q is an
approximation of the evaluation of p.
Approximation: We define two approximation relations: between
modules and between pairs of expressions and heaps.
We write ς ⊑ ς ′ to mean “ς ′ approximates ς ,” or “ς refines ς ′,”
which intuitively means ς ′ stands for a set of states including ς . For
example, (1, {}) ⊑ (a, {a 7→ •}).
One complication introduced by addresses is that a single ad-
dress in the abstract program may accidentally approximate multi-
ple distinct values in the concrete one. Such accidental approxima-
tions are not in general preserved by reduction, as in the following
example where (e1, σ1) ⊑ (e2, σ2):
e1 = (if false 1 2) σ1 = {}
e2 = (if a a a) σ2 = {a 7→ •}
The abstract program does not continue to approximate the con-
crete one in their next states:
e1 7−→ (2, σ
′
1) σ
′
1 = {}
e2 7−→ (a, σ
′
2) σ
′
2 = {a 7→ false}
We therefore also define a “strong” version of the approximation
relation, ⊑F , where each address in the abstract program approx-
imates exactly one value in the concrete program, and this consis-
(u/−→v , σ1) ⊑
F (σ2(a), σ2)
F (a) = u/−→v
(u/−→v , σ1) ⊑
F (a, σ2)
(σ1(a1), σ1) ⊑
F (σ2(a2), σ2)
F (a2) = a1
(a1, σ1) ⊑
F (a2, σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 , σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2), σ2) (vc, σ1) ⊑
F (vd, σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 ∪ {vc}, σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2 ∪ {vd}, σ2)
(u, σ1) ⊑
F (•, σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 , σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2 , σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 ∪ v, σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2 , σ2)
(module f uc • ) ∈
−→m or f ∈ {†, havoc}
(blamefg , σ1) ⊑
F
−→m (e, σ2)
Figure 4. Selected Approximation Rules
tency is witnessed by some function F from addresses to values.
Then e ⊑ e′ means that ∃F.e ⊑F e′ Since no such function ex-
ists between e1 and e2 above, e1 6⊑F e2 for any F , and therefore
e1 6⊑ e2.
Figure 4 shows the important cases in the definition of ⊑F ; we
omit structurally recursive rules. All pre-values are approximated
by •, and unknown values with contracts approximate values that
satisfy the same contracts. We extend the relation ⊑F−→m structurally
to evaluation contexts E , point-wise to sequences, and to sets of
program states.
In the following example, (e1, σ1) ⊑F (e2, σ2), where F =
{a0 7→ false,a1 7→ 1,a2 7→ 2}:
e1 = (if false 1 2) σ1 = {}
e2 = (if a1 a2 a3) σ2 = {a1 7→ •, a2 7→ •, a3 7→ •}
Notice that F ’s domain is a superset of the domain of the heap
σ2. In addition, our soundness result does not consider additional
errors that blame unknown modules or the havoc module, and
therefore we parameterize the approximation relation ⊑F−→m with the
module definitions −→m to select the opaque modules. We omit these
parameters where they are easily inferred to ease notation.
With the definition of approximation in hand, we are now in a
position to state the main soundness theorem for the system.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of Symbolic λC).
If p ⊑F−→m q where q = −→me and ς ∈ eval (p), then there exists some
ς ′ ∈ eval(q) such that ς ⊑F
′
−→m ς
′
.
We defer all proofs to the appendix for space.
3.7 Verification and the blame theorem
We can now define verification as a simple corollary of soundness.
First we defined when a module is verified by our approach.
Definition 1 (Verified module).
A module (module f uc u) ∈ p is verified in p if u 6= • and
eval(p) 6∋ blamef.
Now, by soundness, f is always safe.
Theorem 2 (Verified modules can’t be blamed).
If a module named f is verified in p, then for any concrete program
q for which p is an abstraction, eval(q) 6∋ blamef.
3.8 Taming the infinite state space
A naive implementation of the above semantics will diverge for
many programs. Consider the following example:
(define (fact n)
Expressions e += (rt〈σ,v,v〉 e) | (blur〈F,σ,v〉 e)
Values v += µx.−→v | !x
Evaluation contexts E += (rt〈σ,v,v〉 E) | (blur〈F,σ,v〉 E)
Context memo tables Ξ ::=
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
((σ, v, v),
−−−−−−−→
(F, σ, E ,E))
Value memo tables M ::=
−−−−−−−−−−−→
((σ, v, v),
−−−→
(v, σ))
Renamings F ::=
−−−→
〈a,a〉
Figure 6. Syntax extensions for approximation
(if (= n 0) 1 (* n (fact (- n 1)))))
(fact •)
Ignoring error cases, it eventually reduces non-deterministically to
all of the following:
1 if an 7→ 0
(* an 1) if an 67→ 0, an−1 7→ 0
(* an (* an−1 (fact an−1))) if an, an−1 67→ 0
where an−1 is a fresh address resulting from subtracting an by
one. The process continues with an−2, an−3, etc. This behavior
from the analysis happens because it attempts to approximate all
possible concrete substitutions to abstract values. Although fact
terminates for all concrete naturals, there are an infinite number of
those: an can be 0, 1, 2, and so on.
To enforce termination for all programs, we can resort to
well-known techniques such as finite state or pushdown abstrac-
tions (Van Horn and Might 2012). But often those are overkill at
the cost of precision. Consider the following program:
(let* ([id (λ (x) x)] [y (id 0)] [z (id 1)])
(< y z))
where a monovariant flow analysis such as 0CFA (Shivers 1988)
thinks y and z can be both 0 and 1, and pushdown analysis thinks y
is 0 and z is either 0 or 1. For a concrete, straight-line program,
such imprecision seems unsatisfactory. We therefore aim for an
analysis that provides exact execution for non-recursive programs
and retains enough invariants to verify interesting properties of
recursive ones. The analysis quickly terminates for a majority of
programming patterns with decent precision, although it is not
guaranteed to terminate in the general case—see section 4 for
empirical results.
One technical difficulty is that the semantics of contracts pre-
vents us from using a recursive function’s contract directly as a
loop invariant, because contracts are only boundary-level enforce-
ment. It is unsound to assume returned values of internal calls can
be approximated by contracts, as in f below:
(f : nat? → nat?)
(define (f n) (if (= n 0) "" (str-len (f (- n 1)))))
If we assume the expression (f (- n 1)) returns a number as spec-
ified in the contract, we will conclude f never returns, and is blamed
either for violating its own contract by returning a string, or for ap-
plying str-len to a number. However, f returns 0 when applied
to 1. To soundly and precisely approximate this semantics in the
absence of types, we recover data type invariants by execution.
Summarizing function results: To accelerate convergence, we
modify the application rules as follows. At each application, we de-
cide whether execution should step to the function’s body or wait
for known results from other branches. When an application (f v)
reduces to a similar application, we plug in known results instead
of executing f’s body again, avoiding the infinite loop. Correspond-
E 6= E1[(rt〈σ0,λx.e,v0〉 Ek)] for any E1, Ek, σ0, v0
〈Ξ,M, E [((λx.e) v)], σ〉 7−→ 〈Ξ,M, E [(rt〈σ,λx.e,v〉 [v/x]e)], σ〉
−−−−→
〈ao,an〉 = F σ
′ = σ
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[an 7→ σ0(a0) ⊕ σ(a0)]
〈Ξ,M, E [(blur〈F,σ0,v0〉 v)], σ〉 7−→ 〈Ξ,M, E [v0 ⊕ v], σ
′〉
E = E1[(rt〈σ0,λx.e,v0〉 Ek)] for some E1, Ek, σ0, v0 〈σ,v〉 6⊑ 〈σ0,v0〉 v1 = v0 ⊕ v
〈Ξ,M, E [((λx.e) v)], σ〉 7−→ 〈Ξ,M, E [(rt〈σ,λx.e,v1〉 [v1/x]e)], σ〉
E = E1[(rt〈σ0,vf ,v0〉 Ek)] for some E1, Ek, σ0, v0 〈σ,v〉 ⊑
F 〈σ0,v0〉
Ξ′ = Ξ ⊔ [〈σ0, vf , v0〉 7→ 〈F, σ, E1, Ek〉] 〈va,σa〉 ∈M [〈σ0, vf , v0〉] σ
′ = σ
−−−−−−−−−→
[an 7→ σa[ao]] where
−−−−→
〈ao,an〉 = F
〈Ξ,M, E [(vf v)], σ〉 7−→ 〈Ξ
′,M, E1[(rt〈σ0,vf ,v0〉 (blur〈F,σa,va〉 Ek[va]))], σ
′〉
M ′ = M ⊔ [〈σ0, vf , v0〉 7→ 〈v,σ〉]
〈Ξ,M, E [(rt〈σ0,vf ,v0〉 v)], σ〉 7−→ 〈Ξ,M
′, E [v], σ〉
M ′ = M ⊔ [〈σ0, vf , v0〉 7→ 〈v,σ〉] 〈F, σk, E1, Ek〉 ∈ Ξ[〈σ0, vf , v0〉] σ
′
k = σk
−−−−−−−−−→
[an 7→ σ(ao)] where
−−−−→
〈ao,an〉 = F
〈Ξ,M, E [(rt〈σ0,vf ,v0〉 v)], σ〉 7−→ 〈Ξ,M
′, E1[(rt〈σ0,vf ,v0〉 (blur〈F,σ,v〉 Ek[v]))], σ
′
k〉
Figure 5. Summarizing Semantics
ingly, when (f v) returns, we plug the new-found answer into con-
texts that need the result of (f v). The execution continues until it
has a set soundly describing the results of (f v).
To track information about application results and waiting con-
texts, we augment the execution with two global tables M and Ξ
as shown in figure 6. We borrow the choice of metavariable names
from work on concrete summaries (Johnson and Van Horn 2014).
A value memo table M maps each application to known re-
sults and accompanying refinements. Intuitively, if M(σ, vf , vx) ∋
(v, σ′) then in some execution branch, there is an application
(vf vx), σ 7−→ (v, σ
′).
A context memo table Ξ maps each application to contexts wait-
ing for its result. Intuitively, Ξ(σ, vf , vx) ∋ (F, σ′, E1, Ek) means
during evaluation, some expression E1[(rt〈σ,vf ,vx〉 [Ek[(vf vz)]])]
with heap σ′ is paused because applying (vf vz) under assump-
tions in σ′ is subsumed by applying (vf vx) under assumptions in
σ up to consistent address renaming specified by function F .
To keep track of function applications seen so far, we extend
the language with the expression (rt〈σ,v,v′〉 e), which marks e as
being evaluated as the result of applying v to v′, but otherwise
behaves like e. The expression (blur〈F,σ,v〉 e), whose detailed
role is discussed below, approximates e under guidance from a
“previous” value v.
Finally, we add recursive contracts µx.−→v and recursive refer-
ences !x for approximating inductive sets of values. For example,
µx.{empty, 〈•/nat?,!x〉} approximates all finite lists of naturals.
A state in the approximating semantics with summarization
consists of global tables Ξ, M , and a set S of explored states −→ς .
Reduction now relates tables Ξ, M , and a set of states −→ς to
new tables Ξ′, M ′ and a new set of states −→ς ′. We define a relation
〈Ξ,M, ς〉 7−→ 〈Ξ,M, ς〉, and then lift this relation point-wise to
sets of states. Figure 5 only shows rules that use the global tables
or new expression forms.
In the first rule, if an application ((λx.e) v) is not previously
seen, execution proceeds as usual, evaluating expression e with x
bound to v, but marking this expression using rt.
Second, if a previous application of ((λx.e)v0) results in appli-
cation of the same function to a new argument v, we approximate
the new argument before continuing. Taking advantage of knowl-
edge of the previous argument, we guess the transition from the v0
to v and heuristically emulate an arbitrary amount of such trans-
formation using the ⊕ operator. For example, if v0 is empty and v
is 〈1,empty〉, we approximate the latter to µx.{empty, 〈1,!x〉}, de-
noting a list of 1’s. If a different number is later prepended to the
list, it is approximated to a list of numbers. The ⊕ operator should
work well in common cases and not hinder convergence in the gen-
eral case. Failure to give a good approximation to a value results in
non-termination but does not affect soundness.
Third, when an application results in a similar one with poten-
tially refined arguments, we avoid stepping into the function body
and use known results from table M instead. In addition, we refine
the current heap to make better use of assumptions about the par-
ticular “base case”. We also remember the current context as one
waiting for the result of such application. To speed up convergence,
apart from feeding a new answer va to the context, we wrap the en-
tire expression inside (blur〈F,σ,v〉 [ ]) to approximate the future
result.
The fourth rule in figure 5 shows reduction for returning from
an application. Apart from the current context, the value is also
returned to any known context waiting on the same application.
Besides, the value is also remembered in table M . The resumption
and refinement are analogous to the previous rule.
Finally, expression (blur〈F,σ,v0〉 v) approximates value v un-
der guidance from the previous value v0 and also approximates val-
ues on the heap from observation of the previous case. Overall, the
approximating operator ⊕ occurs in three places: arguments of re-
cursive applications, result of recursive applications, and abstract
values on the heap when recursive applications return. Empirical
results for our tool are presented in section 4.
Soundness of summarization: A system (Ξ,M, S) approxi-
mates a state ς if that state can be recovered from the system
through approximation rules. The crucial rule, given below, states
that if the system (Ξ,M, S) already approximates expression e and
the application (vf vx) is known to reduce to e, then (Ξ,M, S) is
an approximation of Ek[e] where Ek is a waiting context for this
application.
(rt〈_,v,_〉 [ ]) /∈ E0
(vx, σ) ⊑ (vz, σ
′) (vy , σ) ⊑ (vz, σ
′)
Ξ(σ′, v, vz) ∋ (F, σ
′, E ′0, E
′
k) (E0, σ) ⊑ (E
′
0, σ
′)
(Ek, σ) ⊑ (E
′
k, σ
′) (E0[(rt〈σ1,v,vy〉 e)], σ) ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
(E0[(rt〈σ0,v,vx〉 Ek[(rt〈σ1,v,vy〉 e)])], σ) ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
As a consequence, summarization properly handles repetition of
waiting contexts, and gives results that approximate any number
of recursive applications. We refer readers to the appendix of the
accompanying technical report for the full definition of the approx-
imation relation.
With this definition in hand, we can state the central lemma to
establish the soundness of the revised semantics that uses summa-
rization.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of summarization).
If ς ⊑ (Ξ,M, S) and ς 7−→ ς ′, then (Ξ,M, S) 7−→ (Ξ′,M ′, S′)
such that ς ′ ⊑ (Ξ′,M ′, S′).
The proof is given in the accompanying technical report. With
this lemma in place, it is straightforward to replay the proof of the
soundness and blame theorems.
4. Implementation and evaluation
To validate our approach, we implemented a static contract check-
ing tool, SCV, based on the semantics presented in section 3, along
with a number of implementation extensions for increased preci-
sion and performance. We then applied SCV to a wide selection of
programs drawn from the literature on verification of higher-order
programs, and report on the results.
The source code for SCV and all benchmarks are available along
with instructions on reproducing the results we report here:
github.com/philnguyen/soft-contract
In order to quantify the importance of the techniques presented in
this paper, we also created a simpler tool which omits the key con-
tributions of this work. This slimmed down system, which we refer
to as “Simple” below, (a) does not call out to a solver, but relies
on remembering seen contracts, (b) never refines the contracts as-
sociated with a heap address, but splits disjunctive contracts and
unrolls recursive contracts, and (c) does not use our technique for
summarizing repeated context. To enable a full comparison on all
benchmarks, the Simple tool supports first-class contracts. This
simpler system is extremely similar to that presented by our ear-
lier work (Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012), but works on all
of our benchmarks.
Implementation extensions: SCV supports an extended language
beyond that presented in section 3 in order to handle realistic pro-
grams. First, more base values and primitive operations are sup-
ported, such as strings and symbols (and their operations), although
we do not yet use a solver to reason about values other than inte-
gers. Second, data structure definitions are allowed at the top-level.
Each new data definition induces a corresponding (automatic) ex-
tension to the definition of havoc to deal with the new class of data.
Third, modules have multiple named exports, to handle the exam-
ples presented in section 2, and can include local, non-exported,
definitions. Fourth, functions can accept multiple arguments and
can be defined to have variable-arity, as with +, which accepts ar-
bitrarily many arguments. This introduces new possibilities of er-
rors from arity mismatches. Fifth, a much more expressive con-
tract language is implemented with and/c, or/c, struct/c, µ/c for
conjunctive, disjunctive, data type, and recursive contracts, respec-
tively. Sixth, we provide solver back-ends for both CVC4 (Barrett
et al. 2011) and Z3 (De Moura and Bjørner 2008).
Evaluating on existing benchmarks: To evaluate the applica-
bility of SCV to a wide variety of challenging higher-order con-
tract checking problems, we collect examples from the follow-
ing sources: programs that make use of control-flow-based typing
from work on occurrence typing (Tobin-Hochstadt and Felleisen
2010), programs from work on soft typing, which uses flow anal-
ysis to check the preconditions of operations (Cartwright and Fa-
gan 1991), programs with sophisticated specifications from work
on model checking higher-order recursion schemes (Kobayashi
et al. 2011), programs from work on inference of dependent re-
finement types (Terauchi 2010), and programs with rich contracts
from our prior work on higher-order symbolic execution (Tobin-
Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012). We also evaluate SCV on three
interactive student video games built for a first-year programming
course: Snake, Tetris, and Zombie. These programs were all orig-
inally written as sample solutions, following the style expected of
students in the course. Of these, Zombie is the most interesting:
it was originally an object-oriented program, translated using the
encoding seen in section 2.5.
We present our results in summary form in table 1, grouping
each of the above sets of benchmark programs; expanded forms
of the tables are provided in the accompanying technical report.
The table shows total line count (excluding blank lines and com-
ments) and the number of static occurrences of contracts and prim-
itives requiring dynamic checks such as function applications and
primitive operations. These checks can be eliminated if we can
show that they never fail; this has proven to produce significant
speedups in practice, even without eliminating more expensive con-
tract checks (Tobin-Hochstadt et al. 2011).
The table reports time (in milliseconds) and the number of
false positives for SCV and our reduced system omitting the key
contributions of this work (labeled “Simple”); “∞” indicates a
timeout after 5 minutes.
A false positive is a contract violation reported by the analysis,
but by human inspection, cannot happen. The programs we con-
sider are all known not to have contract errors, and thus all potential
errors are false positives.
In cases where a tool times out, we give an upper bound on
the number of false positive error reports. For example, the Simple
system times out on two of the higher-order recursion scheme
programs, meaning that if it were to complete, it would report at
most 94 false positives, counting all contract checks from the two
programs on which it times out, and the measured false positives
on the programs where it completes.
Execution times are measured on a Core i7 2.7GHz laptop with
8GB of RAM.
Discussion: First, SCV works on a benchmarks for a range of
previous static analyzers, from type systems to model checking to
program analysis.
Second, most programs are analyzed in a reasonable amount of
time; the longest remaining analysis time is under 30 seconds. This
demonstrates that although the termination acceleration method of
section 3.8 is not fully general, it is effective for many program-
ming patterns. For example, SCV terminates with good precision
on last from Wright and Cartwright (1997), which hides recursion
behind the Y combinator.
Third, across all benchmarks, over 99% (2329/2335) of the
contract checks are statically verified, enabling the elimination both
of small checks for primitive operations and expensive contracts;
see below for timing results. This result emphasizes the value of
static contract checking: gaining confidence about correctness from
expensive contracts without actually incurring their cost.
Overall, our experiments show that our approach is able to dis-
cover and use invariants implied by conditional flows of control
and contract checks. Obfuscations such as multiple layers of ab-
stractions or complex chains of aliases do not impact precision (a
common shortcoming of flow analysis).
Our approach does not yet give a way to prove deep structural
properties expressed as dependent contracts such as “map over a
list preserves the length” or “all elements in the result of filter sat-
isfy the predicate”, resulting in the false positives seen in table 1.
However, it can already be used to verify many interesting pro-
grams because often safety questions depend only on knowledge
of top-level constructors. Examples of these patterns appear in pro-
grams from Kobayashi et al. (2011) for programs such as reverse
(see also §2.4), nil, and mem.
Simple SCV
Corpus Lines Checks Time (ms) False Pos. Time (ms) False Pos.
Occurrence Typing 115 142 155.8 15 8.9 0
Soft Typing 134 177 424.5 9 380.3 0
Higher-order Recursion Schemes 301 467 ∞ ≤ 94 3,253.8 4
Dependent Refinement Types 69 116 ∞ ≤ 66 193.0 1
Higher-order Symbolic Execution 236 319 ∞ ≤ 19 4,372.7 1
Student Video Games
Snake 202 270 9,452.5 0 3.008.8 0
Tetris 308 351 ∞ - 27,408.5 0
Zombie 249 393 ∞ - 11,335.9 0
Table 1. Summary benchmark results. (See the accompanying technical report for detailed results.)
Finally, soft contract verification is more broadly applicable
than the systems from which our benchmarks are drawn, which
typically are successful only on their own benchmarks. For ex-
ample, type systems such as occurrence typing (Tobin-Hochstadt
and Felleisen 2010) cannot verify any non-trivial contracts, and
most soft typing systems do not consider contracts at all. Systems
based on higher-order model-checking (Kobayashi et al. 2011), and
dependent refinement types (Terauchi 2010) assume a typed lan-
guage; encoding our programs using large disjoint unions produces
unverifiable results.
This broad applicability is why we are not able to directly com-
pare SCV to these other systems across all benchmarks. Instead,
the Simple system serves as a benchmark for a system which does
not contain our primary contributions.
Contract optimization: We also report speedup results for the
three most complex programs in our evaluation, which are inter-
active games designed for first-year programming courses (Snake,
Tetris, and Zombie). For each, we recorded a trace of input and
timer events while playing the game, and then used that trace to re-
run the game (omitting all graphical rendering) both with the con-
tracts that we verified, and with the contracts manually removed.
Each game was run 100 times in both modes; the total time is pre-
sented below.
Program Contracts On (ms) Contracts Off (ms)
snake 475,799 59
tetris 1,127,591 186
zombie 12,413 1,721
The timing results are quite striking—speedup ranges from over
5x to over 5000x. This does not indicate, of course, that speedups
of these magnitudes are achievable for real programs. Instead, it
shows that programmers avoid the rich contracts we are able to
verify, because of their unacceptable performance overhead. Soft
contract verification therefore enables programmers to write these
specifications without the run-time cost.
The difference in timing between Zombie and the other two
games is intriguing because Zombie uses higher-order dependent
contracts extensively, along the lines of vec/c from section 2.5,
which intuitively should be more expensive. An investigation re-
veals that most of the cost comes from monitoring flat contracts, es-
pecially those that apply to data structures. For example, in Snake,
disabling posn/c, a simple contract that checks for a posn struct
with two numeric fields, cuts the run-time by a factor of 4. This
contract is repeatedly applied to every such object in the game. In
contrast, higher-order contracts, as in the object encodings used in
Zombie, delay contracts and avoid this repeated checking.
5. Related work
In this section, we relate our work to four related strands of re-
search: soft-typing, static contract verification, refinement types,
and model checking of recursion schemes.
Soft typing: Verifying the preconditions of primitive operations
can be seen as a weak form of contract verification and soft typing
is a well studied approach to this kind of verification (Cartwright
and Felleisen 1996). There are two predominant approaches to
soft-typing: one is based on a generalization of Hindley-Milner
type inference (Cartwright and Fagan 1991; Wright and Cartwright
1997; Aiken et al. 1994), which views an untyped program as be-
ing embedded in a typed one and attempts to safely eliminate co-
ercions (Henglein 1994). The other is founded on set-based ab-
stract interpretation of programs (Flanagan et al. 1996; Flanagan
and Felleisen 1999). Both approaches have proved effective for
statically checking preconditions of primitive operations, but the
approach does not scale to checking pre- and post-conditions of ar-
bitrary contracts. For example, Soft Scheme (Cartwright and Fagan
1991) is not path-sensitive and does not reason about arithmetic,
thus it is unable to verify many of the occurrence-typing or higher-
order recursion scheme examples considered in the evaluation.
Contract verification: Following in the set-based analysis tra-
dition of soft-typing, there has been work extending set-based
analysis to languages with contracts (Meunier et al. 2006). This
work shares the overarching goal of this paper: to develop a static
contract checking approach for components written in untyped
languages with contracts. However the work fails to capture the
control-flow-based type reasoning essential to analyzing untyped
programs and is unsound (as discussed by Tobin-Hochstadt and
Van Horn (2012)). Moreover, the set-based formulation is complex
and difficult to extend to features considered here.
Our prior work (Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012), as dis-
cussed in the introduction, also performs soft contract verification,
but with far less sophistication and success. As our empirical re-
sults show, the contributions of this paper are required to tackle the
arithmetic relations, flow-sensitive reasoning, and complex recur-
sion found in our benchmarks.
An alternative approach has been applied to checking contracts
in Haskell and OCaml (Xu 2012; Xu et al. 2009), which is to inline
monitors into a program following a transformation by Findler and
Felleisen (2002) and then simplify the program, either using the
compiler, or a specialized symbolic engine equipped with an SMT
solver. The approach would be applicable to untyped languages ex-
cept for the final step dubbed logicization, a type-based transforma-
tion of program expressions into first-order logic (FOL). A related
approach used for Haskell is to use a denotational semantics that
can be mapped into FOL, which is then model checked (Vytinio-
tis et al. 2013), but this approach is highly dependent on the type
structure of a program. Further, these approaches assume a differ-
ent semantics for contract checking that monitors recursive calls.
This allows the use of contracts as inductive hypotheses in recursive
calls. In contrast, our approach can naturally take advantage of this
stricter semantics of contract checking and type systems, but can
also accommodate the more common and flexible checking policy.
Additionally, our approach does not rely on type information, the
lack of which makes these approaches inapplicable to many of our
benchmarks.
Contract verification in the setting of typed, first-order contracts
is much more mature. A prominent example is the work on verify-
ing C# contracts as part of the Code Contracts project (Fähndrich
and Logozzo 2011).
Refinement type checking: Refinement types are an alterna-
tive approach to statically verifying pre- and post-conditions in
a higher-order functional language. There are several approaches
to checking type refinements; one is to restrict the computational
power of refinements so that checking is decidable at type-checking
time (Freeman and Pfenning 1991); another is allow unrestricted
refinements as in contracts, but to use a solver to attempt to dis-
charge refinements (Knowles and Flanagan 2010; Rondon et al.
2008; Vazou et al. 2013). In the latter approach, when a refine-
ment cannot be discharged, some systems opt to reject the pro-
gram (Rondon et al. 2008; Vazou et al. 2013), while others such as
hybrid type-checking residualize a run-time check to enforce the
refinement (Knowles and Flanagan 2010), similar to the way soft-
typing residualizes primitive pre-condition checks. The end result
of our approach most closely resembles that of hybrid checking,
although the technique applies regardless of the type discipline and
approaches the problem using different tools.
DJS (Chugh et al. 2012b,a) supports expressive refinement
specification and verification for stateful JavaScript programs, in-
cluding sophisticated dependent specifications which SCV cannot
verify. However, most dependent properties require heavy annota-
tions. Moreover, null inhabits every object type. Thus the approach
cannot give the same guarantees about programs such as reverse
(§2.4) without significantly more annotation burden. Additionally,
it relies on whole program annotation, type-checking, and analysis.
Model checking higher-order recursion schemes: Much of the
recent work on model checking of higher-order programs relies on
the decidability of model checking trees generated by higher-order
recursion schemes (HORS) (Ong 2006). A HORS is essentially a
program in the simply-typed λ-calculus with recursion and finitely
inhabited base types that generates (potentially infinite) trees. Pro-
gram verification is accomplished by compiling a program to a
HORS in which the generated tree represents program event se-
quences (Kobayashi 2009b; Kobayashi et al. 2010). This method is
sound and complete for the simply typed λ-calculus with recursion
and finite base types, but the gap between this language and real-
istic languages is significant. Subsequently, an untyped variant of
HORS has been developed (Tsukada and Kobayashi 2010), which
has applications to languages with more advanced type systems,
but despite the name it does not lead to a model checking proce-
dure for the untyped λ-calculus. A subclass of untyped HORS is
the class of recursively typed recursion schemes, which has appli-
cations to typed object-oriented programs (Kobayashi and Igarashi
2013). In this setting, model checking is undecidable, but relatively
complete with a certain recursive intersection type system (any-
thing typable in this system can be verified). To cope with infinite
data domains such as integers, counter-example guided abstraction
refinement (CEGAR) techniques have been developed (Kobayashi
et al. 2011). The complexity of model checking even for the simply
typed case is n-EXPTIME hard (where n is the rank of the recur-
sion scheme), but progress on decision procedures (Kobayashi and
Ong 2009; Kobayashi 2009a) has lead to verification engines that
can verify a number of “small but tricky higher-order functional
programs in less than a second.”
In comparison, the HORS approach can verify some specifica-
tions which SCV cannot, but in a simpler (typed) setting, whereas
our lightweight method applies to richer languages. Our approach
handles untyped higher-order programs with sophisticated lan-
guage features and infinite data domains. Higher-order program
invariants may be stated as behavioral contracts, while the HORS-
based systems only support assertions on first order data. Our work
is also able to verify programs with unknown external functions,
not just unknown integer values, which is important for modular
program verification, and we are able to verify many of the small
but tricky programs considered in the HORS work.
6. Conclusions and perspective
We have presented a lightweight method and prototype implemem-
tation for static contract checking using a non-standard reduction
semantics that is capable of verifying higher-order modular pro-
grams with arbitrarily omitted components. Our tool, SCV, scales
to realistic language features such as recursive data structures and
modular programs, and verifies programs written in the idiomatic
style of dynamic languages. The analysis proves the absence of run-
time errors without excessive reliance on programmer help. With
zero annotation, SCV already helps programmers find unjustified
usage of partial functions with high precision and could even be
modified to suggest inputs that break the program. With explicit
contracts, programmers can enforce rich specifications to their pro-
grams and have those optimized away without incurring the signif-
icant run-time overhead entailed by dynamic enforcement.
While in this paper, we have addressed the problem of soft con-
tract verification, the technical tools we have introduced apply be-
yond this application. For example, a run of SCV can be seen as
a modular program analysis—it soundly predicts which functions
are called at any call site. Moreover it can be composed with whole-
program analysis techniques to derive modular analyses (Van Horn
and Might 2010). A small modification to blur to cause it to pick
a small set of concrete values would turn our system into a con-
colic execution engine (Larson and Austin 2003). Adding temporal
contracts (Disney et al. 2011) to our system would produce a model
checker for higher-order languages. This breadth of application fol-
lows directly from the semantics-based nature of our approach.
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〈v0,v1〉 ⊕ 〈v2,v3〉 = 〈v0 ⊕ v2, v1 ⊕ v3〉
µx.−→v0 ⊕ µy.
−→v1 = µx.(
−→v0 ⊕
−−−−−→
[!x/!y]v1)
µx.−→v0 ⊕ v = µx.(
−→v0 ⊕ [!x/µx.
−→v0 ]v)
v0 ⊕ v1 = µx.{v0, [!x/v0]v1} if v0 ∈s v1
n0 ⊕ n1 = •/int? if n0 6= n1
v0 ⊕ v1 = v1 otherwise
Figure 11. Approximation
ς ∈ (Ξ,M, S)
ς ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
ς ⊑ ς ′ ς ′ ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
ς ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
(rt〈_,v,_〉 /∈ )E0 (vx, σ) ⊑ (vz, σ
′) (vy , σ) ⊑ (vz, σ
′)
Ξ(σ′, v, vz) = (F, σ
′, E ′0, E
′
k) (E0, σ) ⊑ (E
′
0, σ
′)
(Ek, σ) ⊑ (E
′
k, σ
′) (E0[(rt〈σ1,v,vy〉 ]), σ) ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
(E0[(rt〈σ0,v,vx〉 E)k[(rt〈σ1,v,vy〉 e)]], σ) ⊑ (Ξ,M, S)
Figure 12. Approximation of Summarizing Semantics
A. Full Formalism
This section presents full materials omitted from the paper. Figure 7
shows the complete operational semantics of Symbolic λC. Figure
8 shows the full implementation of the basic proof system (without
calling out to the SMT solver). Any triple of 〈σ, v, c〉 not applica-
ble to these rules are implicitly related by σ ⊢ v : c ?. Figure 9
shows the implementation of basic operations. Figure 10 defines
approximations between expression-store pairs as well as program
states. Figure 11 displays definitions for operator ⊕ which approx-
imates a value with knowledge of a “prior” value. Figure 12 defines
approximation between a state 〈e,σ〉 and a system 〈Ξ,M, S〉. We
abbreviate simple predicates of the form λx.(o? x) as o?.
B. Proofs
This section presents proofs for theorems in the paper. Lemmas 6
and 10 prove theorems 1 and 1, respectively. Other lemmas support
these main ones.
Lemma 2 (Soundness of δ).
If (−→v1 , σ1) ⊑ (−→v2 , σ2) then δ(σ1, o,−→v1) ⊑ δ(σ2, o,−→v2).
Proof. By inspection of δ and cases of o and (−→v1 , σ1) ⊑ (−→v2 , σ2).
Lemma 3 (Soundness of function application).
If (vf , σ1) ⊑ (vg, σ2), (vx, σ1) ⊑ (vy , σ2), and (vf vx), σ1 7−→
ς , then (vg vy), σ2 7−→ ς ′ such that ς1 ⊑ ς2.
Proof. By case analysis on e1 , where (e1, σ′1) = ς1 and (e1, σ′2) =
ς2
• Case 1 e1 = blame because δ(σ1, proc?, vf1) ∋ (false, σ′1)
By lemma 2, δ(σ2, proc?, vf2) ∋ (false, σ′2), which means
(vf2 vx2), σ2 7−→ (blame, σ
′
2).
• Case 2 e1 6= blame because δ(σ1, proc?, vf1) ∋ (true, σ′1).
Case analysis on the derivation of (vf1, σ1) ⊑ (vf2, σ2)
Case 2a Both vf1 and vf2 are lambdas and step to struc-
turally similar states.
Case 2b (vf1, σ1) ⊑ (a, [a 7→ •]). Then (vf2 vx2) steps to
(a′, [a′ 7→ •]).
Lemma 4 (Soundness of flat contract checking).
If (vc, σ1) ⊑ (vd, σ2) and (v1, σ1) ⊑ (v2, σ2), then
• σ1 ⊢ v1 : vc! implies (vd v2, σ2) 7−→ (vt, σ′2) such that
δ(σ′2, false?, vt) ∋ (false, σ
′′
2 ) and σ1 ⊑ σ′′2 , and
• σ1 ⊢ v1 : vc% implies (vd v2, σ2) 7−→ (vt, σ′2) such that
δ(σ′2, false?, vt) ∋ (true, σ
′′
2 ) and σ1 ⊑ σ′′2 .
Proof. By case analysis on the derivation of (vc, σ1) ⊑ (vd, σ2)
and inspection of provability relation.
Lemma 5 (Heap substitution).
If (e1, σ1) ⊑ (e2, σ2) and σ′1 ⊑ σ′2 then (e1, σ′1) ⊑ (e2, σ′2).
Proof. By induction on e2.
Lemma 6 (Soundness of reduction relation).
If p ⊑ q and p 7−→ p′ where p′ 6= blame, then q 7−→ q′ such that
p′ ⊑ q′ for some q′.
Proof. By case analysis on the derivation of p 7−→ p′.
• Case 1
p = −→m1 E1[e1], σ1 7−→ E1[e
′
1], σ
′
1
q = −→m2 E2[e2], σ2 7−→ E2[e
′
2], σ
′
2
where (E1, σ1)⊑−→m2 (E2, σ2) and (e1, σ1)⊑−→m2 (e2, σ2).
Case 1a: e1 = fg
If f = g, they both step to the simple value in module f , so
e′1 ⊑ e
′
2 because −→m1 ⊑ −→m2
If f 6= g, e′1, e′2 is mon(uc, u1) and E′2 is mon(uc, u2)where
u1 ⊑ u2.
Case 1b: e1 is a function application (lemma 3).
Case 1c: e1 is a primitive application (lemma 2).
Case 1d: e1 = if v1 e1a e1b and e2 = if v2 e2a e2b
If both v1 and v2 are non-labels, there are no change to the
heaps, and the case is structural. Otherwise, v2 is a label, the
case follows by lemma 5.
Case 1e: e1 = mon(vc, v1) and e2 = mon(vd, v2) and c is
flat.
We do case analysis on (σ1 ⊢ v1 : vc).
If σ1 ⊢ v1 : vc ?, the next states for both are structurally
similar.
If σ1 ⊢ v1 : vc! or σ1 ⊢ v1 : vc%, we rely on lemma 4.
Otherwise, e1 and e2 step to structurally similar states.
Case 1*: All other cases involve stepping to structurally
similar states or looking up environments, which are straight-
forward.
• Case 2
P = −→m1 E1a[E1b[e1]], σ1 7−→ E1a[E1b[e
′
1]], σ
′
1 and Q =−→m2 E2a[E2b[e2]], σ2 where E1a is the largest context such that
E1a ⊑−→m2 E2a but E1b 6⊑−→m2 E2b. This means E1b[e1] ⊑ E2b[e2]
by one of the non-structural rules for ⊑, which are insensitive
to e1’s content. Hence E1b[e′1] ⊑ E2b[e2]
Lemma 7 (Soundness of havoc).
If there exists a context E such that
−→m (module f uc u) ⊢ E [f ], σ 7−→ blame
f
g
then
−→m (module f uc u) ⊢ (havoc f), σ 7−→ blame
f
g .
(module x uc u) ∈
−→m
xx, σ 7−→ u, σ
(module x uc u) ∈
−→m x 6= ℓ
xℓ, σ 7−→ monx,ℓx (uc, u), σ (λx.e) u, σ 7−→ [u/x]e, σ
u 6= •
u, σ 7−→ u/∅, σ
δ(σ, proc?, v) ∋ (false, σt)
v v′ℓ, σ 7−→ blameℓΛ, σt
a /∈ σ
•, σ 7−→ a, σ[a 7→ •/∅]
δ(σ, o,−→v ) ∋ (a, σa)
o−→v , σ 7−→ a, σa
(σ′, v′) = refine(σ, v, vc)
assume(v, vc), σ 7−→ v
′, σ′
δ(σ, false?, v) ∋ (false, σt)
if v e1 e2, σ 7−→ e1, σt
δ(σ, false?, v) ∋ (true, σf )
if v e1 e2, σ 7−→ e2, σf
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (false, σ
′) σ′ ⊢ v : vc!
mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(vc, v), σ 7−→ v, σ
′
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (false, σ
′) σ′ ⊢ v : vc%
mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(vc, v), σ 7−→ blame
ℓ
ℓ′′ , σ
′
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (false, σ
′) σ′ ⊢ v : vc ?
mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(vc, v), σ 7−→ if (vc v)
ℓ′′
assume(v, vc) blame
ℓ
ℓ′′ , σ
′
δ(σ, proc?, v) ∋ (true, σ1)
mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(vc→λx.d, v), σ 7−→ λx.mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(d, v monℓ
′,ℓ
ℓ′′
(vc, x)), σ1
δ(σ, dep?, a) ∋ (true, σ1) δ(σ1, proc?, v) ∋ (true, σ2) σ2(a) = vc→λx.d
mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(a, v), σ 7−→ λx.monℓ,ℓ
′
ℓ′′
(d, v monℓ
′,ℓ
ℓ′′
(vc, x)), σ2
δ(σ, dep?, vc) ∋ (true, σ1) δ(σ1, proc?, v) ∋ (false, σ2)
mon
ℓ,ℓ′
ℓ′′
(vc, v), σ 7−→ blame
ℓ
ℓ′′ , σ2
δ(σ, proc?, a) ∋ (true, σ′)
a v, σ 7−→ aa, σ
′[aa 7→ •]
HAVOC
δ(σ, proc?, a) ∋ (true, σ′)
a v, σ 7−→ havoc v, σ′
Figure 7. Operational semantics for Symbolic λC
σ ⊢ n : int?! σ ⊢ false : false?! σ ⊢ empty : empty?! σ ⊢ 〈v1,v2〉 : cons?! σ ⊢ λx.e : proc?!
σ ⊢ v→λx.c : dep?!
σ ⊢ v : o′?! o
′
? 6= o?
σ ⊢ v : o?%
vc ∈
−→v
σ ⊢ u/−→v : vc!
σ ⊢ v : λx.e!
σ ⊢ v : λx.(¬ e)%
σ ⊢ v : λx.e%
σ ⊢ v : λx.(¬ e)!
λx.(¬ e) ∈ −→vc
σ ⊢ u/vc : λx.e%
σ ⊢ σ(a) : vc!
σ ⊢ a : vc!
σ ⊢ σ(a) : vc%
σ ⊢ a : vc%
Figure 8. Basic Proof System
Proof. Any context triggering a blame of f can be reduced to a
canonical form of:
E ::= [ ] | (E u) | (car E) | (cdr E),
which can be approximated by contexts of the form:
E ′ ::= [ ] | (E ′ •) | (car E ′) | (cdr E ′).
By induction on E ′, for any v, if E ′[v] 7−→ a, then (havoc v) 7−→
(havoc a).
Lemma 8 (Return frame).
If (∅, ∅, {(e, ∅)}) 7−→ (Ξ,M, S) and E [(rt〈σ,vf ,vx〉 e′)] ∈ S,
then E [(vf vx)] ∈ S.
Proof. By induction on (∅, ∅, {(e, ∅)}) 7−→ (Ξ,M, S) and case
analysis on the last reduction to E [(rt〈σ,vf ,vx〉 e
′
)], assuming
programmers cannot write expressions of the form (rt〈σ,v,v〉 e).
Lemma 9.
If 〈E [(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 v)],σ〉 ⊑ 〈Ξ,M, S〉 where (rt〈_,vf ,_〉 [ ]) /∈ E ,
then there is ς ∈ S such that 〈E [(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 v)],σ〉 ⊑ ς
Proof. By case analysis on the last step deriving
〈E [(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 v)],σ〉 ⊑ 〈Ξ,M, S〉
Lemma 10 (Soundness of summarization).
If ς1 ⊑ (Ξ1,M1, S1) and ς1 7−→ ς2, then (Ξ1,M1, S1) 7−→
(Ξ2,M2, S2) such that ς2 ⊑ (Ξ2,M2, S2).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ς1 ⊑ (Ξ1,M1, S1) and
case analysis on the reduction ς1 7−→ ς2.
Let (e1, σ1) = ς1, (e2, σ2) = ς2, e1 = E [e′1] and e2 = E [e′2]
where e′1 is a redex.
• Case 1: ς1 ⊑ (Ξ1,M1, S1) because ς1 ∈ S1
Case analysis on ς1 7−→ ς2:
Sub-case: e′1 = (λx.e v)
We have E [(λx.e) v] 7−→ E [(rt〈σ1,λx.e,v〉 [v/x]e)]
− Sub-sub-case 1: 〈Ξ1,M1, ς1〉 proceeds with the same
reduction , which straightforwardly approximates ς2
σ ⊢ v : o?!
δ(σ, o?, v) ∋ (σ, true)
σ ⊢ v : o?%
δ(σ, o?, v) ∋ (σ, false)
σ ⊢ v : o? ? (σ′, _) = refine(σ, v, o?)
δ(σ, o?, v) ∋ (σ
′, true)
σ ⊢ v : o? ? (σ′, _) = refine(σ, v,¬o?)
δ(σ, o?, v) ∋ (σ
′, false) δ(σ, +, n1, n2) ∋ (n1+n2, σ)
δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, false)
δ(σ, +, v1, v2) ∋ (blameΛ, σ1)
δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, true) δ(σ1, int?, v2) ∋ (σ2, false)
δ(σ, +, v1, v2) ∋ (blameΛ, σ2)
v1 6= n or v2 6= n δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, true) δ(σ1, int?, v2) ∋ (σ2, true) a /∈ σ2
δ(σ, +, v1, v2) ∋ (a, σ2[a 7→ •/int?]) δ(σ, =, n, n) ∋ (true, σ)
n1 6= n2
δ(σ, =, n1, n2) ∋ (false, σ)
δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, false)
δ(σ, =, v1, v2) ∋ (blameΛ, σ1)
δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, true) δ(σ1, int?, v2) ∋ (σ2, false)
δ(σ, =, v1, v2) ∋ (blameΛ, σ2)
δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, true) δ(σ1, int?, v2) ∋ (σ2, true) v1 6= v2
δ(σ, =, v1, v2) ∋ (false, σ2)
δ(σ, int?, v1) ∋ (σ1, true) δ(σ1, int?, v2) ∋ (σ2, true)
δ(σ, =, v1, v2) ∋ (true, σ2) δ(σ, cons, v1, v2) ∋ (〈v1,v2〉, σ) δ(σ, car, 〈v1,v2〉) ∋ (v1, σ)
δ(σ, cons?, a) ∋ (true, σ′) σ′(a) = 〈v1,v2〉
δ(σ, car, a) ∋ (v1, σ)
δ(σ, cons?, a) ∋ (false, σ′)
δ(σ, car, v) ∋ (blameΛ, σ) δ(σ, cdr, 〈v1,v2〉) ∋ (v2, σ)
δ(σ, cons?, a) ∋ (true, σ′) σ′(a) = 〈v1,v2〉
δ(σ, cdr, a) ∋ (v2, σ)
δ(σ, cons?, a) ∋ (false, σ′)
δ(σ, cdr, v) ∋ (blameΛ, σ)
Figure 9. Basic Operations
n ⊑F •/int?
(v1, σ) ⊑
F (v′1, σ
′) (v2, σ) ⊑
F (v′2, σ
′)
(〈v1,v2〉, σ) ⊑
F (〈v′1,v
′
2〉, σ
′)
(u/−→v , σ1) ⊑
F (σ2(a), σ2)
(u/−→v , σ1) ⊑
F (a, σ2)
F (a) = u/−→v
(σ1(a1), σ1) ⊑
F (σ2(a2), σ2)
(a1, σ1) ⊑
F (a2, σ2)
F (a2) = a1
(u1/
−→v1 , σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2), σ2) (vc, σ1) ⊑
F (vd, σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 ∪ {vc}, σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2 ∪ {vd}, σ2) (u, σ1) ⊑
F (•, σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 , σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2 , σ2)
(u1/
−→v1 ∪ v, σ1) ⊑
F (u2/
−→v2 , σ2)
(module f uc • ) ∈
−→m or f ∈ {†, havoc}
(blamefg , σ1) ⊑
F
−→m (e, σ2) (x, σ) ⊑
F (x, σ′)
(e, σ) ⊑F (e′, σ′) (ex, σ) ⊑
F (e′x, σ
′)
(e ex, σ) ⊑
F (e′ e′x, σ
′)
(ei, σ) ⊑
F (e′i, σ
′) for each ei in −→e , e′i in
−→
e′
(o−→e , σ) ⊑F (o
−→
e′ , σ′)
(e1, σ) ⊑
F (e′1, σ
′) (e2, σ) ⊑
F (e′2, σ
′) (e3, σ) ⊑
F (e′3, σ
′)
(if e1 e2 e3, σ) ⊑
F (if e′1 e
′
2 e
′
3, σ
′)
(c, σ) ⊑F (c′, σ′) (d, σ) ⊑F (d′, σ′)
(c→λx.d, σ) ⊑F (c→λ′.xd′, σ′)
(c, σ) ⊑F (c′, σ′) (e, σ) ⊑F (e′, σ′)
(monℓ
′,ℓ′′
e (c, ℓ)σ) ⊑
F (monℓ,ℓ
′
ℓ′′
(c,′ )′, σ′) (blame
ℓ
ℓ′σ) ⊑
F (blameℓℓ′′σ
′)
Figure 10. Approximation
− Sub-sub-case 2: 〈Ξ1,M1, ς1〉 proceeds with widened
argument , which also straightforwardly approximates
ς2
− Sub-sub-case 3: (Ξ1,M1, S1) 7−→ (Ξ′1,M1, S′1)
where E = E0[(rt〈σ0,λx.e,v0〉 Ek)]
and (v0, σ0) ⊑F (v′, σ1)
and Ξ′1 = Ξ1 ⊔ [(σ′1, λx.e, v′) 7→ (F, σ0, E0, Ek)]
and S′1 ⊇ S1
But because E0[(rt〈σ0,λx.e,v0〉 E)k] ∈ S
′
1, it follows
that E0[(λx.e) v0] is also in S′1.
Hence (Ξ′1,M1, S′1) 7−→ (Ξ′1,M1, S′′1 ) such that
E0[(rt〈σ0,λx.e,v0〉 [v0/x]e)] ∈ S
′′
1 .
Thus E0[(rt〈σ0,λx.e,v0〉 Ek[[v0/x]e])] ⊑ (Ξ
′
1,M1, S
′′
1 ),
or E ′[[v0/x]e] ⊑ (Ξ
′
1,M1, S
′′
1 )
Other sub-cases are straightforward
• Case 2: ς1 ⊑ (Ξ1,M1, S1) because: ς1 ⊑ ς ′1 and ς ′1 ⊑
(Ξ1,M1, S1)
By lemma 6 (straightforwardly extended with rt expressions),
ς1 7−→ ς2 implies ς ′1 7−→ ς ′2) such that ς2 ⊑ ς ′2
By induction hypothesis, (Ξ1,M1, S1) 7−→ (Ξ2,M2, S2)
such that ς ′2 ⊑ (Ξ2,M2, S2)
Therefore ς2 ⊑ (Ξ2,M2, S2)
• Case 3: ς1 ⊑ (Ξ1,M1, S1) because:
E [e′1] = E0[(rt〈σx,v,vx〉 Ek[(rt〈σy ,v,vy〉 e
′
)])]
E0[(rt〈σy ,v,vy〉 e
′
)] ⊑ (Ξ1,M1, S1)
(F, σ′k, E
′
0, E
′
k) ∈ Ξ(σ
′, v, vz)
(vx, σx) ⊑ (σ
′, vz) ⊒ (vy , σy)
(Ek, σ1) ⊑ (E
′
k, σ
′
k)
(E0, σ1) ⊑ (E
′
0, σ
′
k)
There are 2 subcases: either e′ is a value or not.
Sub-case 1: e′ = va
This means e1 = E0[(rt〈σx,v,vx〉 Ek[(rt〈σy ,v,vy〉 va)])]
and e2 = E0[(rt〈σx,v,vx〉 Ek[va])]
By lemma 9, there exists E ′′0[(rt〈σ′y ,v,v′y〉 v
′
a)] ∈ S1
such that E ′0[(rt〈σy ,v,vy〉 va)] ⊑ E
′′
0[(rt〈σ′y ,v,v′y〉 v
′
a)].
Then (Ξ1,M1, S1) 7−→ (Ξ′1,M ′1, S′1) such that S′1 ∋
(E ′0[(rt〈σ′,v,vz〉 E
′
k[va])]).
Sub-case 2: e′ = El[e′1] (where e′1 is the redex)
We have
E0[(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 El[e
′
1])] 7−→ E0[(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 El[e
′
2])].
By induction hypothesis, (Ξ1,M1, S1) 7−→ (Ξ2,M2, S2),
such that E0[(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 El[e
′
2])] ⊑ (Ξ2,M2, S2).
Because Ξ2 ⊇ Ξ1,
E0[(rt〈σ0,vf ,vx〉 E
′
kEl[e
′
2])] ⊑ (Ξ2,M2, S2)
follows.
C. Detailed evaluation results
This section shows detailed evaluation results for benchmarks col-
lected from different verification papers. All are done on a Core i7
@ 2.70GHz laptop running Ubuntu 13.10 64bit. Analysis times are
averaged over 10 runs. For benchmarks that time out, we display a
range estimating number of false positives.
Simple SCV
Program Lines Checks Time (ms) False/+ Time (ms) False/+
O
cc
u
rr
en
ce
Ty
pi
n
g
Ex
am
pl
es
ex-01 6 4 2.9 1 0.3 0
ex-02 6 8 6.8 0 0.5 0
ex-03 10 12 27.3 0 1.8 0
ex-04 11 12 20.6 1 0.7 0
ex-05 6 6 5.4 2 0.4 0
ex-06 8 11 10.0 0 0.6 0
ex-07 8 7 5.3 2 0.5 0
ex-08 6 11 12.9 1 0.7 0
ex-09 14 12 20.5 1 0.8 0
ex-10 6 8 3.7 1 0.3 0
ex-11 8 8 11.6 1 0.8 0
ex-12 5 11 6.1 2 0.4 0
ex-13 9 11 10.1 1 0 0
ex-14 12 20 12.6 2 1.1 0
Total 115 142 155.8 15 8.9 0
Simple SCV
Program Lines Checks Time (ms) False/+ Time (ms) False/+
So
ft
Ty
pi
n
g
Ex
am
pl
es
append 8 15 12.8 0 2.0 0
cpstak 23 15 195.9 2 157.9 0
flatten 12 24 16.3 1 177.7 0
last-pair 7 9 4.5 2 0.6 0
last 17 21 12.9 1 2.5 0
length-acc 10 14 74.2 1 3.3 0
length 8 13 46.4 1 1.6 0
member 8 15 5.6 0 2.3 0
rec-div2 9 17 6.4 0 1.9 0
subst* 11 12 4.8 1 13.3 0
tak 12 14 9.8 0 0.7 0
taut 9 8 34.9 0 16.5 0
Total 134 177 424.5 9 380.3 0
Simple SCV
Program Lines Checks Time (ms) False/+ Time (ms) False/+
H
ig
he
r-
o
rd
er
R
ec
u
rs
io
n
Sc
he
m
e
Ex
am
pl
es
intro1 10 11 12.7 1 0.6 0
intro2 10 11 12.8 1 12.7 0
intro3 10 12 13.9 1 13.0 0
sum 7 12 20.7 2 362.2 0
mult 9 20 12.2 2 55.9 0
max 13 11 47.7 2 40.2 0
mc91 8 15 15.1 2 96.6 1
ack 9 16 22.1 2 6.7 0
repeat 7 11 34.4 2 2.7 0
fhnhn 15 15 31.5 1 3.2 0
fold-div 18 34 ∞ - 1047.2 0
hrec 9 13 148.6 3 26.8 0
neg 18 15 30.2 1 37.7 0
l-zipmap 17 31 ∞ - 1403.7 2
hors 19 17 47.6 2 73.5 0
r-lock 17 19 10.1 2 0.8 0
r-file 44 62 76.6 0 5.1 0
reverse 11 28 24.9 1 12.7 0
isnil 8 17 13.4 2 4.1 0
mem 11 28 28.0 2 3.3 0
nth0 15 27 10.2 0 2.3 0
zip 16 42 29.6 1 42.8 1
Total 301 467 (642.3,∞) (29,94) 3253.8 4
Simple SCV
Program Lines Checks Time (ms) False/+ Time (ms) False/+
D
ep
.
Ty
pe
In
f.
boolflip 10 17 1.5 0 1.7 0
mult-all 10 18 1.2 0 0.4 0
mult-cps 12 20 ∞ - 146.9 0
mult 10 17 ∞ - 20.4 0
sum-acm 10 15 ∞ - 11.27 1
sum-all 9 15 11.3 0 0.4 0
sum 8 14 ∞ - 11.9 0
Total 69 116 (14,∞) (0,66) 193.0 1
Simple SCV
Program Lines Checks Time (ms) False/+ Time (ms) False/+
Sy
m
bo
lic
Ex
ec
u
tio
n
Ex
am
pl
es
all 9 16 16.7 0 3.2 0
even-odd 10 11 9.7 0 27.1 0
factorial-acc 10 9 13.8 0 2.8 0
factorial 7 8 5.9 0 74.4 0
fibonacci 7 11 7.3 0 1632.1 0
filter-sat-all 11 18 38.0 1 11.4 1
filter 11 17 25.2 0 6.2 0
foldl1 9 17 11.8 0 2.4 0
foldl 8 10 10.4 0 2.1 0
foldr1 9 11 10.6 0 4.1 0
foldr 8 10 15.5 0 3.3 0
ho-opaque 10 14 11.7 0 1.2 0
id-dependent 8 3 2.6 1 0.2 0
insertion-sort 14 30 65.8 1 24.6 0
map-foldr 11 20 19.5 1 3.8 0
mappend 11 31 29.6 0 2.2 0
map 10 13 25.0 1 3.3 0
max-var 13 11 76.0 0 12.7 0
recip-contract 7 9 20.2 0 0.5 0
recip 8 15 20.0 2 0.6 0
rsa 14 5 35.0 0 2.3 0
sat-7 20 12 ∞ - 2548.1 0
sum-filter 11 18 49.9 0 4.1 0
Total 236 319 (520,∞) (7,19) 4372.7 1
